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HIS Survey period has been relatively uneventful, for once, so far
as judicial events of earthshaking importance are concerned.
While the Texas Supreme Court continued to decide a respectable
number of family law-related cases, recent cases tend more to fine-tune
existing doctrine than to establish any remarkable new law. One exception, though only tangentially related to this Survey, is National County
Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Johnson,1 in which a bare majority of

the Court invalidated the family member exclusion in auto insurance policies on the ground that it conflicts with the Texas Motor Vehicle SafetyResponsibility Act. 2 Moreover, since the Texas Legislature was not in
session during the Survey period, practitioners have been given a muchneeded opportunity to familiarize themselves with some of the statutory
rewrites of.the 1993 session.

* B.F.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Baylor University; LL.M. Harvard University. Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Stephen B. Hesse and
Kevin W. Liles, students at the South Texas College of Law, assisted greatly in the prepara-

tion of this Article.
1. 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993).
2. Section 21(b) of the act requires liability insurance which will pay "all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle." TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h
§ 21(b)(Vemon 1986 & Supp. 1995). Five members of the Court joined in an opinion written by Justice Hightower, holding that any exclusion of family members is against the
broad public policy for inclusion set out in the above-quoted statutory language. National
County Mutual, 879 S.W.2d at 3. A separate concurring opinion by Justice Cornyn expressly limited the invalidity of the exclusion only to the minimum statutory limits of liability. Id. at 5 (Comyn, J., concurring). Since Justice Cornyn's vote was essential to the
majority ruling, this limitation is "the law," at least for the time being. See id. at 5 n.1.
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I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS:
EXTENDING BATSON TO EXCLUSION OF WOMEN
What is arguably the most important family law-related decision in this
Survey period came, not from the Texas Supreme Court, but from the
United States Supreme Court. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,3 a paternity case, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 4 prohibits gender-based discrimination in jury selection. In J.E.B., an Alabama
paternity suit, the state used nine of its ten peremptory jury strikes to
remove male jurors, with the result that the alleged father was tried by an
all-female jury.
In Batson v. Kentucky,5 the United States Supreme Court earlier outlawed the race-based use of peremptory challenges, stating that a "defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria."' 6 The J.E.B. Court extended this rationale to sex-based use of peremptory challenges. Speaking for the majority, and relying in some small part on evidence from
Texas, 7 Justice Harry Blackmun stated that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."'8 He added:
Since Reed v. Reed, 9 ... this Court consistently has subjected genderbased classifications to heightened scrutiny in recognition of the real
danger that government policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact may be reflective of "archaic and overbroad" generalizations about gender . . . or based on "outdated
misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather
than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas.' "l
This extension of Batson to gender discrimination was predictable;" the
Court even observed that "short of overruling a decade of cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the result we reach today is doctrinally
'12
compelled.'
Of course, Batson-style challenges already have made their way into
the Texas family law arena. In the current Survey period, for example, at
least one decision rebuffed a claim that all African-Americans had been
3. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
5. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. Id. at 85-86.
7. The majority opinion quotes the observation, from an old Dallas prosecutor's
manual: "I don't like women jurors because I can't trust them. They do, however, make
the best jurors in cases involving crimes against children. It is possible that their 'women's
intuition' can help you if you can't win your case with the facts." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426
n.10.
8. Id. at 1421.
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
10. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424-25 (citations omitted).
11. See, e.g., Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-BasedPeremptory Challenges,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1920, 1921 (1992); but see United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215 (5th

Cir. 1993)(refusing to extend Batson to gender).
12. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.12.
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struck for discriminatory reasons. 13 Nonetheless, considering the much
greater number of family law issues in which sexual, rather than racial,
stereotypes may come into play, J.E.B. surely will have a much more
widespread effect on the process than did Batson.
Any extended speculation on the likely impact of J.E.B. is well beyond
the scope of this Survey. In all likelihood, however, voir dire will become
an even more substantial element of the trial. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion notes that by "further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury
selection-once a sideshow-will become part of the main event."'1 4 A
Texas commentator already has picked up on this aspect of the decision,
commenting that "trial lawyers should consider J.E.B. useful authority
15
against a trial court's restriction of time in voir dire.'
Moreover, the dramatic expansion of Batson-style challenges occasioned by J. E.B. may bring increased pressure for the elimination of peremptory challenges altogether. In Batson, Justice Marshall suggested that
the potential for abuse inherent in peremptory challenges "should ideally
6
lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.'
More pragmatically, a Florida court has observed that complete elimination of peremptory challenges would be preferable to "a prolonged caseby-case strangulation.., over a period of many years which in the end
will effectively eviscerate the peremptory challenge or, at best, result in a
convoluted and unpredictable system of jury selection enormously difficult to administer."' 7 A respected Texas proceduralist, responding to
J.E.B., already has taken up this refrain, calling for the elimination of the
peremptory challenge, accompanied by expanded availability of chal8
lenges for cause.'
II. STATUS
The current Survey period contains a fair number of decisions on paternity issues, most centering on procedural defenses. In the Interest of
B.I.V.,19 the sole Texas Supreme Court decision of consequence during
the Survey period, 20 is arguably the most interesting and certainly the
13. In the Interest of A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 243-45 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1994, no writ)(holding, in a termination proceeding, that the decision to strike two prospective African-American jurors on the ground that one lived in the same apartment complex
as the mother and the other was a "grandmotherly type" was not a pretext for racial
discrimination).
14. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15. Michael J. Mazzone, Keeping Up With... Jury Selection, Hous. LAW., July/Aug.
1994, at 24.
16. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring).
17. Alen v. Florida, 596 So.2d 1083, 1088 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
18. Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process,46 BAYLOR L. REv. 947, 1003-04
(1994).
19. 870 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1994).

20. TWo other status-related decisions were issued by the Texas Supreme Court during
the Survey period. One, Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. 1993), was covered
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highest news profile paternity case in the year's crop of decisions, primarily because Raul Longoria, a sitting state district judge, was the claimed

father. 21 The mother brought an action to establish Judge Longoria as
the father of B.I.V. At the time of the action, the Texas Family Code

required that the child have no presumed father. 22 Judge Longoria defended on the theory that, since the mother was married at the time of
23
birth, B.I.V. already had a presumed father.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Judge Longoria. The
mother appealed, claiming that termination of the presumed father's parental rights is not required before suit could be brought against another

man. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed, 24 basing its ruling
on an Austin appeals court decision, State v. Lavan.2 5 The Austin court's
decision was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, which held that the
Attorney General's office could sue to disestablish paternity in one man
and establish paternity in another in a single suit.2 6 The B.I.V. court issued a supplemental opinion on rehearing, to the effect that, while the
Texas Supreme Court's Lavan ruling permitted the two actions to be
brought in a single suit, summary judgment was justified in B.I. V. because

no action against the presumed father was joined with the action against
27

Judge Longoria.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, stating that Judge Longoria's objection to the mother's failure to join the presumed father was "in substance merely a motion to abate ...the granting of which would merely

give [the mother] a reasonable opportunity to amend her suit to remove
the obstacle to its prosecution. '2 8 The high court, therefore, remanded to
permit the mother to amend her pleadings, adding the presumed father as

a necessary party.2 9 The court also noted in passing that a September

preemptively in last year's survey. James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parentand Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1197, 1205-07 (1994). The second, In the
Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994), is a minor rewrite of an earlier version of
the opinion issued and covered extensively by this Annual Survey during the last Survey
period. Paulsen, supra, at 1197-1205.
21. The case has generated continuing coverage in the media. See, e.g., Gordon
Hunter, Ex-Judge Wins Another Round in Paternity Case, TEX. LAW., Feb. 13, 1995, at 13

(reporting that

"TEXAS LAWYER

has covered the case extensively").

22. In the Interest of B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1994). The relevant section has
since been amended. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995)(deleting an earlier sentence requiring that a suit to establish paternity be brought by
"a child who has no presumed father").
23. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a)(1)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)(stating, inter
alia, that "a man is presumed to be the biological father of a child if... the child is born
during the marriage").
24. In the Interest of B.I.V., 843 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), rev'd,
870 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1994).
25. 802 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), rev'd, 833 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992).
26. Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992). The decision is
discussed in some detail in James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parentand Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 1515, 1515-17 (1993).
27. B.I.V., 843 S.W.2d at 66.
28. B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d at 13.
29. Id. at 14.
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1993 amendment to the Texas Family Code would require the mother to
include an express statement in her pleadings denying the presumed fa30
ther's paternity.
Amanda v. Montgomery,31 a decision from the First Court of Appeals,
provides some valuable guidance on procedure and proof requirements
when the paternity issue is raised by the presumed father after a divorce.
In Amanda, the mother brought a motion to increase child support; her
ex-husband counterclaimed with a bill of review action challenging paternity. The court of appeals ruled that the bill of review had to be brought
as a separate action, not as a counterclaim. 32 The discussion of the merits
of the husband's claim, however, is even more interesting.
To succeed in setting aside an earlier judgment, a bill of review must
demonstrate that the first decision was "the result of fraud, accident or
wrongful act of the opposite party, or official mistake-unmixed with [the
complaining party's] own negligence. ' 33 Justice Michol O'Connor's opinion gave two grounds for concluding that the husband failed to support a
bill of review. 34 First, since the divorce predated the amendment of the
Family Code that now permits denial of paternity in a divorce, 35 the exhusband had no right that was denied, by fraud or otherwise. 36 Second,
since the husband claimed adultery in the divorce, he was presumably on
notice of the possibility that the child was not his; thus, the mistake was
not unmixed with his own negligence. 37 In a separate concurrence, Justice Adele Hedges added a third reason: Any lies told by the mother in
divorce proceedings would be intrinsicfraud, not extrinsic fraud, since the
extrinsic fraud that would warrant a bill of review must be collateral to a
matter that actually was tried. 38 In sum, as another writer already has
pointed out, "[w]ith this case, these paternity cases are going to be very

difficult to win

. .

.39

One interesting inheritance decision deserves mention' In York v.
Flowers,40 a recognized child born out of wedlock's claim withstood a
summary judgment challenge, permitting the possible recovery of an interest in land nearly fifty years after the relevant events. Betty York is
the biological daughter of Coburn Barlow. Betty was adopted by Catherine Flowers, who married Coburn Barlow shortly after the adoption.
Barlow died intestate in 1944; in 1955 his widow conveyed a 41.5 acre
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. n.1 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993)).
877 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1994, no writ).
Id. at 485.
See, e.g., Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. 1979).
Amanda, 877 S.W.2d at 485-87.
35. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon 1986)(new section, added 1983); see
also Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38
Sw. L.J. 173, 175 (1984).
36. Amanda, 877 S.W.2d at 486.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 488 (Hedges, J., concurring).
39. David N. Gray, SAPCR-llegitimacy and Paternity, 1994-2 STATE BAR SEc. REP.
41, 42-43.
40. 872 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
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tract of land acquired during the marriage to a third party. In 1992, Betty
sued to establish her rights in the land. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Flowers' successor, based on the three, five, ten and
twenty-five year statutes of limitations, as well as the four-year residual

statute.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment,
ruling in Betty's favor.41 Initially, the court ruled that Betty was entitled
to present proof that Mr. Barlow was her biological father,4 2 in particular,
that she was received into his home and held out to be his biological

child.43 On the limitations issue, while the opinion leaves many of the
details to the imagination, it appears that the adoptive mother's conveyance was to a family member, and that the occupancy was not sufficiently
adverse to cause any one of the possible statutes of limitation to begin
running. The court concluded that "only in rare instances is a court justified in holding that adverse possession has been established as a matter of
44
law" and that "[w]e believe this not to be one of those rare instances."

Ramirez v. Sanchez45 reiterates the general requirement that a written

record be made in a paternity proceeding, 46 even when the putative fa-

ther has waived47any right to paternity testing through failure to appear

for the hearing.
Several paternity cases dealt with time-bar issues in some fashion. In
Matter of Marriage of Collins,48 a divorce suit included establishment of
an informal marriage. Because the defendant failed to complain of the

fact that the claim was not brought within one year of the end of the

relationship, 49 he was presumed by statute to be the child's father.50 In
Blake v. Blake,5 1 the state brought suit in 1992 to establish paternity of a

fourteen-year-old child. The father's first argument, that the case should
be governed by the one-year absolute limitations statute in effect at the
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id. at 15 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1993)(setting out circumstances under which a biological child can claim a paternal inheritance).
43. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)(establishing a presumption of paternity if a child is received into the home and openly held out as a
biological child)).
44. Id.

45. 871 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
46. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1986)(providing that, in a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship, "[a] record shall be made as in civil cases generally unless waived by the parties with the consent of the court")).
47. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.02(d) (Vernon 1986)(stating that "[i]f the
respondent fails to appear and wholly default ... paternity testing shall be waived")).

48. 870 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
49. Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b)(Vernon 1993)(providing that such a
proceeding "must be commenced not later than one year after the date on which the relationship ended or not later than one year after September 1, 1989, whichever is later")).
The court rejected the father's argument that this constituted a jurisdictional bar, construing it instead to be a waivable limitations statute. Collins, 870 S.W.2d at 684-85.
50. Id. at 685; see supra note 23.

51. 878 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, writ denied), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
648 (1994).
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time of the child's birth,52 was rejected because the statute had since been

declared unconstitutional5 3 and thus was "a nullity. ' 54 The suit thus was
governed by the residual four-year limitation period, 55 subject to tolling

by disability. 56 Since the child was fourteen when suit was brought, suit
was filed "well within the residual limitations period" 57 or, put differ-

ently, before limitations even had begun to run.58

In Reyna v. Attorney General,59 the putative father was notified of his
alleged paternity in 1975, though the state did not bring suit until 1992.

The court ruled that laches is not available against a state agency performing a governmental function, "unless some extraordinary circum-

stances exist." 60 Those circumstances, to the court, did not include a
mere seventeen-year delay. In Attorney General v. Allred,61 an action by

the state was not barred, despite the fact that a suit brought by the Tarrant County District Attorney's Office had been dismissed with prejudice
for failure to prosecute some fourteen years earlier. Because the state
did not have independent standing to pursue such an action before
1989,62 and thus was not in privity with a party to the earlier action, the
court concluded that res judicata did not apply.
III.

CONSERVATORSHIP

Several conservatorship-related cases issued from the Texas Supreme
Court during the Survey period. In Brook v. Brook,63 the Court clarified
an issue regarding the burden of proof when a nonparent is awarded custody. The parents had a somewhat unconventional marriage, the tabloid
highlights of which included drug use, mate swapping, inflatable dolls and

manage Atrois.64 The couple separated, the mother abandoned her erst-

while career as a topless dancer, moved in with her parents, and started to
attend church and counseling. The trial court appointed the mother and
52. Id. at 210 (citing Act of June 19, 1975,64th Leg., R.S., ch. 476, § 24, 1975 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1261, 1261-62).
53. Id. (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982)).
54. Id. at 210.
55. Blake, 878 S.W.2d at 210 (citing TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051
(Vernon 1986)).
56. Id (citing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a)(1)(Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1995)(providing that "[a] person is under a legal disability if the person is younger
than 18 years of age")).
57. Id. at 211.
58. Id (citing TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 160.001(b)(Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1995)(providing that "the time of the disability is not included in a limitations
period")).
59. 863 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
60. Id at 559 (citing Attorney General v. Daurbigny, 702 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1985, no writ)).
61. 871 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
62. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(i)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)(granting the
attorney general's office authority to bring "any child support action authorized under Title2 of this code").
63. 881 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1994).
64. Brook v. Brook, 865 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993), aff'd, 881
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1994).
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her parents joint managing conservators, to the exclusion of the
65
husband.
The husband appealed, arguing that the evidence did not establish, in
the words of the Family Code, that his appointment as sole or joint managing conservator "would significantly impair the child's physical health
or emotional development. '66 The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged
that the statutory requirement that the "appointment of parent or parents" 67 as managing conservator be proved to harm the child before custody could be awarded to nonparents, restates the general presumption
that the child's best interest is best served by awarding custody to a natural parent. 68 Nonetheless, though admitting that "the [Family] Code is
somewhat ambiguous" '69 on the point, a unanimous court held that the
fact that one parent (the mother) was appointed a joint managing conservator satisfied the statute's demands, and that the failure also to appoint
the father as a joint managing conservator did not trigger any heightened
standard of proof.70 In the court's words, "[tihe fact that a nonparent
shares custody does not detract from the fact that one of the child's par'
ents does have custody. "71
Two less salacious custody matters also came before the Texas Supreme
Court during the Survey period. In Tippy v. Walker,72 a mandamus proceeding, the Texas Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion that the
six-month residency period stated in the Family Code for mandatory
transfer of venue in child custody modification motions 73 runs from the
date the child actually begins to reside in the new county, not from the
date the original custody decree is signed. The court relied on its prior
decision in Arias v. Spector,74 a 1981 mandamus action involving nowJustice Rose Spector, as containing an implicit holding that the residency
75
period runs from the earlier date.
The other mandamus action was Vaughan v. Walther,7 6 a custody-related disqualification controversy. An attorney was hired by the grandmother on two occasions: first, to represent the mother in a custody
matter; and second, to represent the grandmother against the mother in
an attempt to secure conservatorship. The attorney argued that the first
action was no ground for disqualification because it was dismissed within
two weeks after filing, during which time he never met or spoke with the
65.
66.
1995)).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 169-70.
Id at 172 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(1)(Vernon 1986 & Supp.
Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298.
Id. (citing Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990)).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 230.
Id
865 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1993).
Id at 929 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(b)(Vernon 1986)).
Id. (citing Arias v. Spector, 623 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1981)).
Tippy, 865 S.W.2d at 929.
875 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1994).
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daughter. The court's per curiam opinion avoided the disqualification issue per se, concluding that the daughter waived her rights by waiting until
the day of the custody hearing to file a disqualification motion, despite
the fact that she had some six week notice of the problem.77 Reiterating
an earlier ruling, the high court stated that " '[c]ourts must adhere to an
exacting standard when considering motions to disqualify counsel so as to
discourage their use as a dilatory trial tactic.' ",78
A final conservatorship-related decision from the Texas Supreme
Court, Bird v. WC.W., 7 9 has been tracked through two previous
Surveys.8 0 A father cleared of child abuse charges brought suit against
the psychologist who had misdiagnosed the child. A unanimous Supreme
Court, at least if one counts the concurring opinions, ruled that a mental
health professional does not owe a duty to a third party in this situation,
81
thus barring a negligence action.
The psychologist also repeated the claim of abuse in a court affidavit,
however, something the court felt was outside the scope of her professional relationship. The Texas Supreme Court observed that two possible
privileges applied to this communication: the common law privilege for
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings 82 and the more recent statutory privilege for those reporting child abuse. 83 The psychologist, however, raised only the claim of common law privilege at trial.
Nonetheless, the general public policy reasons underlying that privilege,
as well as the state's "strong interest in protecting children, especially
protecting them against physical and sexual abuse," 84 justified prohibition
of the father's claim.
A decision on a similar issue issued by the El Paso Court of Appeals
during the Survey period also has attracted the Texas Supreme Court's
attention. Gonzalez v. Avalos 8 5 is a tort suit rising from a DHS supervisor's failure to investigate a case of suspected child abuse reported by the
non-custodial parent. The supervisor closed the case without assigning it
for investigation; within a month, the child was admitted to the hospital
with injuries that ultimately proved fatal. Avalos, the father, sued the
supervisor individually and in her official capacity. The El Paso court
ruled that sovereign immunity was waived by the state through the Texas
Tort Claims Act,8 6 and that the mishandling of the intake report was "the
77.
78.
1990)).
79.
80.
81.
82.
1942)).
83.

1d. at 690-91.
Id.at 691 (citing Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.
868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1225-26; Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1527-28.
Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 772-73.
Id. at 771 (citing Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Tex.
Id. at 772 (citing TEX.

FAM. CODE

ANN.§ 34.03 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)).

84. Id.

85. 866 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
86. Id. at 352 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001 - .021. (Vernon 1986 &
Supp. 1995)).
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use, misuse, or failure to use tangible ...property .... "87 While individuals are immune for quasi-judicial acts within the scope of their discretion, the El Paso court reasoned that the supervisor had a ministerial
statutory duty, at a minimum, to "make a thorough investigation" of every
report. 88
The supervisor's final argument was based on the statutory immunity
for child abuse reporting not raised in Bird, extending to "a person reporting or assisting in the investigation of a report" of child abuse. 89 The
appeals court gave short shrift to this argument, observing that the problem was that no investigation whatever was made. Since the statute refers to "the investigation," rather than "investigations". in general, the El
Paso court concluded that the decision not to investigate at all was not
encompassed by the immunity. The Texas Supreme Court has granted
the supervisor's application for writ of error on points indicating particular concern with the official immunity issue. 90
TWo very similar appeals court decisions illustrate application of the
presumption favoring parents over nonparents in awards of managing
conservatorship in more straightforward settings than the Texas Supreme
Court's Brook decision just discussed. 9 1 In Brigham v. Brigham,92 the

Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an award of managing conservatorship
to the grandmother, instead of the parents. Acting in reliance on the
Texas Supreme Court's statement that an award of custody to a
nonparent must be based on "evidence of specific actions or omissions ...
that demonstrate that appointing the parent would result in physical or
emotional harm to the child," 93 the Dallas appeals court sustained a "no

evidence" challenge to the judgment. The court observed that the only
reason relied upon by the trial court for its custody decision was unsupported speculation that an award of custody
to either parent might result
94
in removal of the children from the state.
In Whitwell v. Whitwell,95 the grandparents also intervened, seeking to
prevent the mother from obtaining sole managing conservatorship of the
child on the ground that she would return to her native Australia if
granted custody. The situation was complicated by the fact that the child
had some severe medical problems. The trial court applied the basic pre87. Gonzalez, 866 S.W.2d at 352; see TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021
(Vernon 1986)(imposing liability for injury caused by "a condition or use of tangible personal or real property").
88. Gonzalez, 866 S.W.2d at 350 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.05(a)(Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis in original)).
89. Id. at 351 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
90. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.881 (June 8, 1994).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.

92. 863 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
93. Id. at 762 (citing Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990)).
94. Id. at 764. One commentator has observed that the trial court's decision in Brigham also could have been based on the fact that the father had a long-term affair and child
by another woman, while the mother was carrying on with her minister. See Cathy Medina, SAPCR-Conservatorship,1994-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.FAM. L. 33.
95. 878 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1994, no writ).

19951

FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD

1285

sumption in favor of parents over nonparents, taking into account the fact
that the mother had made appropriate medical inquiries. The El Paso
Court of Appeals affirmed, commenting that "the parents in absence of
positive disqualification, have the first right to the care and custody of
their children, even against others, who might conceivably be in better

financial condition ....

"96

B.J.J.,97

In R.S. v.
another nonparent case with somewhat different
facts, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the award of managing conservatorship to nonparents, who had cared for two of a couple's four children for several years, on proof that the parents voluntarily had no
contact with the children in over a year. The court rejected an argument
that it was against public policy to separate siblings. 98 First, the Dallas
court observed that Texas case law permits the separation of siblings on a
showing of "clear and compelling reasons." 99 Second, since the overriding consideration in every case is the "best interest of the child,"'1 and
since the parents' voluntary separation of the two children from their siblings created a situation in which the children formed familial relations
with the nonparents, the parents had created a clear and compelling reason for separation. 10 1
Green v. McCoy' 0 2 presents an interstate custody dispute in a somewhat unusual context. Mother and child moved from California to Texas
in 1991 and have resided there continuously since. In 1992, the father
filed suit for divorce, and the mother acknowledged notice. The mother
did not show up for trial, evidently because she was under the impression
that the father would concede primary custody to her. Instead, the father
obtained a divorce and sole custody by default in 1993. The father conceded that he did not notify the mother of his intent to seek full custody.
Following the divorce, the father filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in Texas. The trial court refused to grant custody to the
father. Instead, the court temporarily granted custody to the Department
of Human Resources. The father filed for mandamus. The Amarillo
Court of Appeals conditionally granted the writ in part, though giving
little ultimate satisfaction to the father. While conceding that on a showing of a valid prior child custody order, the granting of a writ of habeas
03
corpus ordinarily should be "automatic, immediate, and ministerial,"'
the court noted three exceptions: Habeas corpus relief is not proper if
96. Id. at 223 (citing Valentine v. Valentine, 203 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1947, no writ)).
97. 883 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ).
98. Id. at 720.

99. Id. at 720 (citing Pizzitola v. Pizzitola, 748 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. App.-Houston

[1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (emphasis omitted)). This requirement is not found in the Family
Code. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 821 S.W.2d 458, 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, no writ).

100. id. (citing TEx.

FAM. CODE

ANN. § 14.07(a)(Vemon 1986)).

101. R.S., 883 S.W.2d at 720.
102. 870 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding).
103. Id. at 618 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
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the prior order was issued without prior notice and opportunity for hearing, if the party seeking relief consented to the changed situation for six
months preceding, or if there is serious and immediate concern for the
child's welfare.' 0 4 The latter two situations did not fit the facts, and the
Family Code does not grant authority to modify authority under the first.
Thus, mandamus relief vacating the temporary custody order was
appropriate.
The Amarillo appeals court, however, stopped short of ordering that
the father be given custody of the child. Instead, the court suggested a
more appropriate way for the trial court to proceed. Since the child had
resided in Texas for more than six months, Texas was the child's new
home state.' 0 5 The mother, the court suggested, should file a new suit in
Texas to modify child custody. The El Paso court seemed to express
some doubt about the Texas court's ability to sidestep the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, suggesting that the mother should "if possible, file an action collaterally attacking the California court's
jurisdiction.' 0 6 The court's concern may not be necessary, however.
Discussing this case, Professor John Sampson has correctly noted that the
California judgment "is not entitled to full faith and credit under the
PKPA because the child had Texas as a home state when the California
07
order was rendered.'
Another rather technical interstate custody dispute question was addressed by the Waco Court of Appeals in Hughes v. Black.'0 8 A custody
suit was filed in Limestone County, Texas, despite the fact that Indiana
was the child's "home state."' 0 9 The trial court nonetheless found "that it
ha[d] jurisdiction to decide child custody in this matter"11 0 and proceeded
to enter an agreed temporary visitation order. The Waco appeals court
conceded that jurisdiction was not proper, except to issue temporary orders under appropriate circumstances, but it declined to grant mandamus
relief because the complaining party had a remedy by way of appeal. 1"
The court conceded that a 1993 decision from the Texas Supreme Court
permitted mandamus relief from temporary orders under roughly similar
circumstances," 12 but noted that the temporary orders were not challenged. In dissent, Justice Cummings argued that the relief should be
granted because, in accordance with the purposes of the Uniform Child
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(b)-(d)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)).
Id. at 619 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.52(5)(Vemon 1986)).
Green, 870 S.W.2d at 620.
John J. Sampson, SAPCP-Conservatorship, 1994-2 STATE BAR SEC. REP. &

FAM. L. 27.

108. 863 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, orig. proceeding).
109. The appellate record indicated that the child had resided with a parent in Indiana
for at least six consecutive months preceding the filing of the suit. Id. at 560; see TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.52(5)(Vernon 1986).
110. Hughes, 863 S.W.2d at 560 (quoting the trial court's order).
111. Id. at 561.
112. Id. at 560 (citing Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1993)).
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Custody Jurisdiction Act, 113 "we should expedite the process of getting
this matter to the 'home state' of the child without requiring the parties
and the child to endure shifting the child back and forth during the appellate process. '"114 The mandamus, in Justice Cummings' view, could have
been issued because "the court's assumption of jurisdiction underlies its
approval of the agreed temporary order....
One appellate point bears mention. The Amarillo appeals court recently dismissed an appeal of a child custody matter on the ground that
the appellant filed a notice of appeal, but no cost bond. 116 The appellant
argued that no cost bond was required by law, and that a notice was sufficient under the rules. 117 The Amarillo court, however, concluded that the
general Family Code statement that family law appeals "'shall be as in
civil cases generally' "118 should be read to require a cost bond.
Two tort cases with implications for conservatorship deserve some brief
consideration. In Wofford v. Blomquist,119 the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals ruled that no special relationship akin to that of parent and child
exists between grandparent and grandchild, at least for purposes of the
negligent entrustment doctrine. Thus, grandparents who provided money
for the purchase of their granddaughter's auto were not liable to those
injured by the granddaughter, despite the fact that she had been involved
in four prior collisions (one fatal) before her twentieth birthday. In
Hoffineyer v. Hoffineyer,120 a suit between divorced parents arising from
the accidental death of their child, the Eastland Court of Appeals ruled
to use a gun is an act protected by the parental
that teaching one's 12son
1
immunity doctrine.
Finally, on a related matter, Cole v. Cole122 should be mentioned as a
handy case to cite for the proposition that, even in Texas, the husband's
chances of securing sole or joint managing conservatorship are not improved by teaching the children to drink beer or shoot high-powered
rifles. 123 And on that note, this Survey passes to the subject of child
support.

113. Id. at 561 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.51 (a)(1) (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995)(stating that one purpose of the act is to "avoid jurisdictional competition and
conflict .... )).
114. Hughes, 863 S.W.2d at 561 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 561-62.
116. In the Interest of Hall, 871 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
117. Id. at 251 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(2)).
118. Id. at 252 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.19(a)(Vernon 1986)).
119. 865 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
120. 869 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied).
121. Id. at 668 (citing Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1992)).
122. 880 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, no writ).
123. The presence of two naked strippers probably did not help matters. See id at 480.
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IV. SUPPORT
The Survey period contains the usual slew of decisions on the setting
and modification of child support. In Kish v. Kole,124 an out-of-state support decree was modified upward, due largely to the ex-husband's voluntary underemployment-he was now working in a managerial capacity
for a family-owned company, receiving a salary far below that of paid
managers in similar businesses. By contrast, in Starck v. Nelson, 125 a
Corpus Christi decision, the court determined that an "erratic employment history"'126 standing alone does not exceed a scintilla of evidence of
voluntary underemployment, particularly when most of the job changes
were involuntary.
Starck is more interesting for its discussion of some of the issues raised
when a child support obligor remarries. Texas child support statutes express the relatively clear intent to create "a neutral scheme [for determining appropriate child support] that would be unaffected by the remarriage
of the child support obligor."'1 27 The Family Code provides that a court
may not add the resources or subtract the needs of a new spouse from the
child support calculus; 28 the calculation of "net resources" available for
129
child support pointedly allows only a single person's tax deduction.
Nonetheless, the Starck court stated, "[n]o reported cases interpret the
boundaries of this statutory prohibition"' 30 on considering the income or
needs of the new spouse. 131
The question is not altogether simple. While the statutes do not permit
consideration of the new spouse's impact on the obligor's financial situation, it is equally clear that there is sometimes a very clear relationship.
Even though the adage, "Two can live as cheaply as one" is sometimes
accompanied by the corollary, "Only if one doesn't eat," remarriage
surely can involve some reduction in expense. For example, one new
spouse or the other usually will experience a reduction in living expenses
by moving into the other's home, or through pooling resources for a new
home. Conversely, remarriage often entails added responsibilities for the
debts of the new
spouse, including the statutory imposition of liability for
"necessaries."'1 32 The Family Code contains language broad enough to
permit consideration of such factors, in particular, the statement in section 14.053(e) that in setting or modifying support obligations "[t]he court
may consider any additional factors that increase or decrease the ability
124. 874 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
125. 878 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
126. Id. at 307.
127. Id. at 306.
128. Id at 306 n.5 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.056(c)(Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995)).
129. Id. at 306 n.4 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.053(b)(Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995)).
130. Starck, 878 S.W.2d at 306.
131. This statement by the Starck court is not entirely accurate. See State v. Hernandez,
802 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
132. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon 1993).
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of the obligor to make child support payments."'1 3 3 Moreover, the Family
Code does permit consideration of "gifts" and "spousal maintenance" in
the determination of net resources,'3 although the latter requirement
would make more sense if Texas35were a jurisdiction that permitted permanent court-ordered alimony.'
In Starck, the trial court did not add the new spouse's contribution into
the calculus in determining the obligor's net resources. It did, however,
take those resources into account as a reason for deviating from the support guidelines. 136 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the lower court's approach "allows the court to do indirectly
what the statute directly prohibits.' 37 This probably is no worse than
any other approach, but it surely does not resolve the issue. In Starck, the
trial judge evidently stated quite clearly that the reason for deviating
from the support guidelines was that the obligor had remarried and that
the new spouse's resources were available to pay living expenses. 138 A
less clear situation would be presented if the court simply found living
expenses had decreased, but did not attribute a cause. Similar contributions by relatives can be taken into account in one way or another, as the
Kish case demonstrates. 39 It takes little power of prognostication to observe that, while Starck may be one of the first cases to address this issue
directly, it surely will not be the last.
One somewhat interesting decision, Clark v. Jamison, 40 addresses a
"high end" support question. The couple originally agreed to $4000 per
month in child support; the ex-husband later tried to modify support, arguing among other things that the amount presumptively should be modified because it was not in line with the support guidelines. The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals ruled that the rebuttable presumption in
favor of the support guidelines' 4 1 does not apply to a case in which a
reduction in support is sought. Since the ex-husband had agreed to the
original amount, as specifically permitted by the Family Code, 142 he had
the burden to show a material change in circumstances.' 4 3 This he did
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 14.053(e)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
134. Id. § 14.053(b).

135. See generallyJames W. Paulsen, Remember the Alamo[nyjl The Unique Texas Ban
on Permanent Alimony and the Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1993).

136. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.057(b) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)(permitting
deviation from the support guidelines, but requiring specific fact findings in support of the
deviation).
137. Starck, 878 S.W.2d at 306.
138. Id. at 308 (stating that "[tlhe trial court found that Starck's wife's contribution to
their joint living expenses enabled Starck to pay more child support than if he were solely
responsible for his living expenses").
139. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
140. 874 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
141. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055 (Vernon 1986).

142. Id. § 14.06(a).
143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 14.08(c)(2)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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not do.'" A somewhat similar argument-that a prior support order not
in compliance with the support guidelines by itself established a "material
change in circumstances"-likewise failed in Cole v. Cole,145 although the
Fourteenth Court of Appeals remanded because other evidence estab146

lished a change in circumstances.
In the Interest of Pecht147 squarely addresses a "high end" support question. The Texas Supreme Court's Rodriguez 48 decision, discussed in last
year's Survey,'149 sets out the general scheme. Up to the first $4000 of
income, the statutory percentage presumptively applies without regard to
need. After that point, the child or children's "needs," rather than any
preferred "lifestyle," are the touchstone. 150 The Clark v. Jamison court

avoided the need to determine whether any portion of the children's
$25,000-plus per month "needs" really were the chosen lifestyle of the

custodial parent by reasoning that an amount at least equal to the $4000
per month support obligation represented actual need, and that the inquiry would only take on immediate relevance if there was an attempt to

increase support obligations.' 5 ' Since the Pecht court was reviewing a
support increase, to a total of $3500 per month, the detailed analysis

avoided by the Clark court was essential.
Using Rodriguez analysis, the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Pecht
held that the first $1000 in monthly support obligation presumptively was
justified without regard to need. 152 The remaining $2500 per month had
144. In another case issued during the Survey period, the Tyler Court of Appeals held
that an agreed order modifying child support waives any error "except such as might go to
the jurisdiction of the court." Minnick v. Rogers, 873 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1994, n.w.h.)(quoting Urbanczyk v. Urbanczyk, 634 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982,
no writ)). The argument that the agreement was signed under the threat of sanctions for
late-filed discovery did not, the appeals court found, rise to the level of "duress." Id. Similarly, in Wright v. Wright, 867 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied), the
litigants originally had agreed to split medical expenses not covered by insurance on a 5050 basis. In a modification hearing, apparently without giving any thought to this aspect of
the original order, the parties represented to the court that they were willing to accept a
support and visitation order following the Family Code standard guidelines. While no provision was made for uncovered medical expenses as was made in the original order, this
was a matter within the trial court's discretion. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.061(o)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
145. 882 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
146. The Family Code provides that "[tihe court may consider the guidelines for the
support of a child .

.

. to determine whether there has been a material and substantial

change in circumstances" and that "[i]f the amount of support ... is not in substantial
compliance with the guidelines, this may warrant a modification of a prior order." TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.056(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995)(emphasis added). The fault
with the movant's argument apparently was in reading the statute to mean that proof of an
order not in compliance with the guidelines must result in modification.
147. 874 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, n.w.h.).
148. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993).
149. See Paulsen, supra note 20 at 1208-10.
150. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d at 417.
151. Clark, 874 S.W.2d at 319.
152. Pecht, 874 S.W.2d at 801. Under the statutory guidelines, for two children, twentyfive percent of the obligor's net monthly resources, to a maximum of $4000, is presumptively proper. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055(b)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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to be justified on the basis of need. 153 The evidence reflected that both
children suffered from attention deficit disorder and required psychotherapy. For similar reasons, the trial court reasoned that private school, a
special summer camp and special health care were warranted. 154 The
support obligor argued that his ex-wife's new home, with payments of
$2500 per month, and the $1000-plus a month full-time housekeeper were
lifestyle choices not justified by the childrens' needs. The trial court,
however, evidently felt the expenditures were for the needs of the children because the new home was on the bus route to the children's private
school, the new neighborhood had more children, and the housekeeper
helped to care for the children after school. The Texarkana appeals court
ruled that this decision was within the trial court's discretion, and that the
extra $1500 per month in support did not represent an abuse of that
55
discretion.
The Survey period contains several interesting decisions relating to the
enforcement of support orders. In Buzbee v. Buzbee, 56 the Waco Court
of Appeals addressed the burdens of proof involved in proving and defending against a claim of arrearages. The father was behind in his support obligations, at least according to the records. The question was the
appropriate amount of reductions for direct payments to the mother, and
of credits for expenses during times of possession in excess of court orders. The trial court made extensive fact findings, one of which justified a
finding of arrearages by "splitting the difference" between the amount
claimed by the Attorney General's office and that claimed by the father157
obligor.
The Waco Court of Appeals reversed and rendered, finding that a
proper application of the basic proof presumptions resulted in a clear determination of arrearages. The Waco court read the statutes as placing
the burden of proving the amount in arrears on the plaintiff. 58 The defendant then has to prove offsets for actual support paid during excess
periods of possession. 159 The amount of support not paid through the
court registry was undisputed; nonetheless, the court was not limited to
the record in determining amounts actually paid.' 60 While the evidence
was conflicting, the court was entitled to make a fact finding that substantial additional sums had been paid directly to the managing conservator.161 The record contained no evidence, however, detailing the
amounts spent by the obligor during periods of extended possession.
153. Pecht, 874 S.W.2d at 801.
154. Id.

155. Id. at 803.
156. 870 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, n.w.h.).
157. Id. at 338.
158. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
159. Id. § 14.41(c).

160. Buzbee, 870 S.W.2d at 339 (citing Niles v. Rothwell, 793 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1990, no writ)).
161. Id. at 339-40.
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Thus, since the arrearages could not be reduced on this ground, the Waco
court determined total arrearages and rendered judgment.
Habeas corpus proceedings challenging contempt orders continue to be
a substantial portion of Texas appellate courts' support-related docket.
While most cases deal with the mechanics of the process, several decisions issued during the Survey period are notable for reining in creative
attempts to use contempt orders to collect collateral costs. The contours
of the dispute are easily sketched out. The Texas Constitution prohibits
imprisonment for debt. 162 Thus, contempt powers generally are not available to assure the payment of attorney's fees or court costs in family law
litigation. 163 Attorney's fees and costs assessed in connection with the
164
collection of child support, however, are not considered to be "debts."'
Several cases issued during the Survey period explored the line between
these rules.
In Roosth v. Daggett,165 Roosth obtained mandamus relief, blocking
Judge Daggett from holding him in contempt for failing to honor a turnover order through which his ex-wife was trying to collect her attorney's
fees for the divorce. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals acknowledged the
statutory mandate that "[r]easonable attorney's fees may be taxed as
costs"'166 in contempt proceedings, and that attorney's fees may be considered "necessaries" for the children in appropriate cases. 167 However,
since these attorney's fees were for the divorce per se, not incurred in the
course of a child support proceeding, the trial court was not able to fold
168
them into a child support contempt order.
Ex Parte Hightower 69 is similar in some respects. Several years after
the divorce, the father moved for a change in visitation rights. The court
appointed a guardian ad litem. To assure collection of fees, the ad litem
secured a court order requiring the mother to "pay the Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem Fees and Costs as child support and as costs. '1 70 The Dallas
Court of Appeals rejected this creative writing effort, holding that
"although the ad litem drafted the order to provide that the fees were
171
child support, they are clearly nothing more than attorney's fees.'
A final variation on the theme of costs and attorney's fees was
presented in Ex parte Williams,172 in which the First Court of Appeals
162. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
163. See, e.g., Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 488, 348 S.W.2d 523, 525-26 (1961)(orig.
proceeding).
164. See, e.g., Ex parte Hightower, 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, orig.
proceeding, [writ dism'd w.o.j.]); Ex parte Rogers, 633 S.W.2d 666, 670-01 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1982, orig. proceeding).
165. 869 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding).
166. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18(a)(Vernon 1986).
167. Roosth, 869 S.W.2d at 636. See, e.g., Wolters v. White, 659 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
168. Id. at 637.
169. 877 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding, [writ dism'd w.o.j.]).
170. Id. at 19 (emphasis added by the court).
171. Id. at 21.
172. 866 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
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disapproved an attempt to base a contempt order in part on failure to pay
$1246 in private investigator's fees. Even though those fees were incurred in trying to locate and serve the support obligor, the court held
that they were not within the statutory definition of recoverable
"costs. "1 73
The Texas Supreme Court also handled one child support contempt
case during the Survey period. In Ex parte Roosth,174 a litigant already
discussed 175 obtained modification of a court order sentencing him to incarceration for sixty days on each of three counts of failure to pay child
support, with no time off for good behavior. The Texas Supreme Court
ruled that "[a] trial court has no authority to limit the operation of the
good behavior credit,"'1 76 and thus held that the order was void to that
77
limited extent.1
Ex ParteBrown 78 illustrates the line between an erroneous order and
a void order in a family law-related context. A family court master found
Brown in contempt for making obscene telephone calls to his ex-wife, a
violation of a permanent injunction contained in the divorce decree. 79
Brown appealed the order. For various reasons, including an apparent
request that the matter be continued until Brown could find a new lawyer, the hearing on the appeal was not held within the thirty-day period
provided by the Government Code. 8 0 Brown argued that since the law
provides that a hearing "shall" be held within thirty days, failure to comply rendered the order void.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals conceded that this language was
mandatory, and acknowledged that the issue appeared to be one of first
impression.' 8 ' The reviewing court noted that the trial judge apparently
was trying to assure Brown's right to counsel. 82 While failure to hold the
hearing within the required time was error, it was not such error as would
deprive the court of jurisdiction. 8 3 Brown's remedy, if any there were in
this case, would have been to seek mandamus relief to force the trial
court to hold a timely hearing. 84
173. Williams, 866 S.W.2d at 753. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18(a)(Vernon
1986)(stating in part that "the court may award costs").
174. 881 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1994)(orig. proceeding)(per curiam).
175. See supra notes 165 through 167 and accompanying text.
176. Roosth, 881 S.W.2d at 301.
177. Id.
178. 875 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, orig. proceeding).
179. Brown, 875 S.W.2d at 758.
180. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.012(h)(Vernon 1988)(stating in part that "[tihe
referring court.., shall hold a hearing on all appeals not later than the 30th day after the
date no which the initial appeal was filed with the referring court").
181. Brown, 875 S.W.2d at 759.
182. Id. See Ex parte Skero, 875 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
orig. proceeding)(discussing right to counsel in contempt proceedings and need for informing indigent litigants of this right).
183. Id. at 760.

184. Id.
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Several other cases during the Survey period address the technical requirements for a contempt order. The Family Code requires that any enforcement order imposing imprisonment or a fine set out specifically the
provisions of the order not complied with and the date of each occasion
of noncompliance. 185 The details of compliance must be set out in clear,
specific and unambiguous terms. 186 In Ex parte Coleman,187 the Tyler
Court of Appeals voided a contempt order for lack of specificity because
it incorporated an earlier order not specifying the particular payments in
arrears. In addition, though the parties had stipulated to a payment
schedule, the stipulations were not spelled out in the order.
Similarly, in Ex parte Russell, 88 the order was held void because it did
not set all support violations with specificity, with the result that the detailed numbers did not add up to the total arrearages. In addition, several
failed payments occurred at a time when the earlier order had not yet
been written down. Since a written order is required, 8 9 the support obligor could not be jailed because of violations of an order not yet written.
A good part of the problem with the Russell order, as with the Coleman
order, was simply a matter of drafting. The Russell order set out multiple
violations, most of which would have passed muster, but assessed a single
penalty.' 90 When a single punishment is assessed for multiple acts of contempt, a problem with a single predicate act voids the order. 19 ' The solution would have been to tie the punishment to each act of contempt,
rendering the order only partially void and assuring that the contemnor
92
would remain in custody.'
Ex parte Christensen193 may be an example of a decision that sacrifices
the purposes of child support enforcement statutes on the altar of technical accuracy. The original order of contempt placed the obligor on probation and required payments on the first and fifteenth of each month.
Probation was revoked when the terms of the order were not met, despite
the fact that the obligor's employer apparently withheld the required
amounts from his pay on August 17 and August 28, and the support order
185. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.33(a)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
186. Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967)(orig. proceeding).
187. 864 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-yler 1993, orig. proceeding).
188. 875 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, orig. proceeding).
189. Ex parte Padron, 565 S.W.2d 9212, 924 (Tex. 1978)(orig. proceeding)(stating that
"[olne who is committed to jail for contempt should be able to find somewhere in the
record the written order").
190. Russell, 875 S.W.2d at 469 n.6.
191. Ex parte Davila, 718 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex. 1986).
192. A similar problem, though involving violation of visitation provisions, rather than
support obligations, arose during the Survey period in Ex parte Sealy, 870 S.W.2d 663 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994). Sealy was held in contempt for violating two provisions
of a custody order: denying her ex-husband telephone access and refusing visitation rights
on a specific date. A single 24-day jail term, probated on conditions, was assessed for the
violations. Since the provisions of the custody order did not take effect until September 1,
1995, violation of the provisions was a temporal impossibility on October 19, 1993, the date
of the contempt motion. Since a single punishment encompassed both offenses, the order
was void. Id. at 667.
193. 868 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding).
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was made subject to the provisions of the wage withholding order. The
problem, in essence, was that the general support order contemplated bimonthly paychecks while the employee actually was paid every two
weeks.
The Houston Court of Appeals (First District) was spared the trouble
of determining whether the trial court's order for employer payments superseded the dates in the contempt order because the record did not indicate whether the employer actually was served with a withholding order
before the critical August dates. 1 94 In an able dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Oliver-Parrott discussed ambiguous language in the wage withholding order that seemed to authorize the August payments as actually
made. In an unusually acerbic but (to this writer) accurate observation,
the editor of the State Bar's Family Law Section newsletter also comis not to jail oblimented that "the real purpose of ordering child support
195
working.
them
keep
to
but
gors who are paying,
Two cases issued during the Survey period address the time limits for
bringing actions to collect child support arrearages. Under section
14.41(b) of the Family Code, the trial court retains jurisdiction to entertain a motion to collect arrearages for four years after the child becomes
or the support obligation ceases. 196 In In the Interest of
an adult
19 7
M.J.Z.,
the Houston Court of Appeals (First District) addressed a
claim that the Attorney General's office should be held to the ordinary
standard of "due diligence"' 198 in securing service when trying to collect
past due child support. In M.J.Z., the Attorney General's office filed a
motion to collect past due child support forty-nine days before the child's
twenty-second birthday; service was not effected, however, for some
three-and-one-half months. The Houston court rejected ordinary due diligence analysis.1 9 Since a family court has continuing jurisdiction over
such matters, the court reasoned that section 14.41(b) should be treated
20 0 This conclusion
as a jurisdictional statute, not a statute of limitations.
is reinforced by the Family Code's language requiring that a motion "be
filed" within four years of majority, 20 ' not that the plaintiff "bring 2suit"
02
within that time, the language used in typical statutes of limitation.
Allen v. Blackwel 2°3 raised a different interpretive question relating to
section 14.41(b). The Blackwells divorced in 1982; the mother was given
194. Id. at 379.

37.

195. John J. Sampson, SAPCR-Child Support, 1994-2

STATE BAR SEC. REP. FAM. L.

196. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(b)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
197. 874 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
198. See, e.g., Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990)(setting out a due diligence standard for service in ordinary civil litigation).
199. M.J.Z., 874 S.W.2d at 726.
200. 11.
201. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 14.41(b)(Vernon Supp. 1995).
202. See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.002-.004 (Vernon 1986);
M.JZ., 874 S.W.2d at 726.
203. 866 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
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custody of the couple's two children and the father paid support. In 1986,
the father became managing conservator of the older child, and his support obligation was halved. In 1988, he became managing conservator of
the younger child as well, and his support obligations ceased. In 1992,
more than four years after support obligations ceased, the mother sought
managing conservatorship of the younger child, as well as back support
payments totalling $16,400, for the period from 1982 through 1988.
The trial court, focusing on section 14.41(b)(2), 204 decided it lacked jurisdiction to award back support payments because it was more than four
years since the support obligation ceased; 20 5 the mother argued, in reliance on section 14.41(b)(1), 2°6 that the four-year period had not begun to
run because the younger child was still below the age of majority. The
Waco Court of Appeals sided with the trial court and the father, ruling
that the disjunctive "or" in the statute meant that suit must be brought
within the lesser of the two periods. Among the reasons cited by the
the ruling dovetails with a
Waco court for its decision is the fact that
20 7
statute.
contempt
the
under
result
similar
In recent years, litigants who defend successfully against custody and
support enforcement actions have become increasingly aggressive in
seeking sanctions. The 1993 Survey 208 reported on Black v. Dallas
County Child Welfare Unit,20 9 a case of first impression from the Texas
Supreme Court establishing the right of a litigant to recover sanctions
from the Attorney General's office for frivolous litigation. Black involved the assessment of sanctions under Chapter 105 of the Texas Civil
Practice & Remedies Code, which provides for the recovery from a state
agency 210 of "fees, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees" if the court
finds an action is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."' 21' In
this Survey period, in Attorney General v. Cartwright,21 2 the Houston

Court of Appeals (Fourteenth District) arguably expanded the boundaries of Black.
In Cartwright,the Attorney General's office pursued Sheila Cartwright
through a succession of support actions, claiming she was delinquent in
her obligations under a Louisiana order. Ms. Cartwright repeatedly de204. This portion of the statute provides that jurisdiction to entertain a motion to collect past-due child support ceases four years after "the date on which the child support
obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by obligation of law." TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 41.41(b)(2)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
205. Allen, 866 S.W.2d at 109.
206. This portion of the statute, already discussed, provides that actions for past due
child support must be brought within four years of the time "the child becomes an adult."
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(b)(1)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
207. Allen, 866 S.W.2d at 109. See also TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(b)(Vernon
1986); Ex parte Walker, 739 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
208. See Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1525-27.
209. 835 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1992).
210. For purposes of Chapter 105, the Attorney General's office is defined as a state
agency. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(3)(Vernon 1986).
211. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 105.002 (Vernon 1986).
212. 874 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
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nied that any such order existed. A January 1991 suit was dismissed after
the Attorney General's office failed to produce the supposed order. A
July 1991 suit ultimately was dismissed with prejudice after the Attorney
General's office failed to show for a de novo appeal from a master's finding (favorable to the Attorney General). An appeal from this ruling was
voluntarily dismissed. Nonetheless, the Attorney General's office filed a
notice of delinquency. The Attorney General's office dismissed this notice with prejudice, with the agreed dismissal order reciting that the action
was "frivolous, groundless, and without legal authority. '2 13 Amazingly
enough, the state then filed a motion for new trial, to which Ms. Cart2 14
wright finally responded with a successful Rule 13 sanction motion,
securing $2000. Months later, though the dismissal indisputably was final,
the Attorney General's office filed a motion to vacate the dismissal; Ms.
Cartwright responded with another successful sanctions motion, securing
an additional $3000.
The Attorney General's principal argument, that sovereign immunity
bars the collection of such sanctions, is relatively uninteresting. The
Houston appeals court held, in proper reliance on Black, that the "plain
language" of Chapter 105 "is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
21 5
and a statutory remedy for costs, expenses and attorney's fees."
The more interesting argument advanced by the Attorney General is
that Ms. Cartwright's sole available relief was under Chapter 105, and
that Cartwright did not meet Chapter 105's procedural requirements.
The Houston appeals court stated that, since Rule 13 permits the imposition of sanctions against "any attorney" 2 16 who files a groundless pleading in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, that the Attorney
General opens itself to sanctions. One commentator has noted that Cartdon't
wright "can be (and should be) interpreted to say that even if you 217
If
comply with [Chapter 105], you can still obtain Rule 13 sanctions.
true, this would be a significant legal development, since the Texas
Supreme Court in Black disclaimed any intended effect of the decision
beyond Chapter 105 actions. On the other hand, the Houston Court of
Appeals (Fourteenth District) also found that the sanctions motion did
substantially comply with Chapter 105 requirements, 21 8 and the Texas
219
Supreme Court's "writ denied" designation is extremely ambiguous.
In a note of irony, the Attorney General's office apparently collected and
forwarded a $5000 IRS refund check under the invalid notice of delin213. Id. at 213.
214. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 13.
215. Cartwright,874 S.W.2d at 217; see Black, 835 S.W.2d at 629.
216. Id at 219; see also TEx. R. Civ. P. 13.
217. David N. Gray, SAPCR-Child Support, 1994-2 STATE BAR SEC. REP. FAM. L. 36.
218. Cartwright, 874 S.W.2d at 218-19.
219. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 889 F.2d 674, (5th
Cir. 1989)(stating that "the implications of the [Texas] state supreme court's 'denial' of
writs ... are not clear").
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quency;220 Ms. Cartwright therefore may have ended up well behind on
the exchange.
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Survey period contains no particularly startling cases on termination and adoption. Several cases, however, are worth mention. The lone
decision from the Texas Supreme Court, Matter of Thacker,221 involved
disbarment of an attorney with a private adoption practice who was con222
victed of the felony of violating Texas' "baby-selling" statute.
Thacker's ten-year sentence was probated. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the argument that, in determining whether violation of the statute
was a "felony involving moral turpitude," Thacker's mental state or motives should be considered. Instead, the seven-judge majority opinion
concluded that "[e]ven though it is difficult to sketch a clear boundary for
the precise limits of a lawyer's continued moral fitness to practice, the
that line and forfeited
lawyer convicted of purchase of a child has crossed
'223
her privilege to continue the practice of law."

Two recent decisions from the same court illustrate the proof requirements on appeal for challenging decisions terminating parental rights,
and provide an interesting juxtaposition of judicial rhetoric. The Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals sustained the termination of parental rights in
In the Interest of A.D.E.224 on the ground that the father had failed to
support his child for a twelve-month period and that termination was in
the child's best interest. 225 The court noted that grounds for termination
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, 226 and that this standard is stricter than the typical civil standard, falling somewhere between
the typical civil "preponderance" standard and the criminal "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. However, echoing earlier decisions, the
court ruled that, no matter what the trial burden, the appropriate appellate standard still is sufficiency of the evidence. 227 Thus, since the father
appealed only on "no evidence" grounds, evidence that he worked at
least sporadically during the year, coupled with his admission that he
could have sent some money for support, was considered sufficient to
sustain termination.
The tone and result in Ybarra v. Tex. Dep't of Human Services22 8 is far
different. Elida Ybarra, a mildly retarded mother of five who earned approximately $1000 per month working in a tavern, had on an earlier occa220. See Gray, supra note 217, at 35.
221. 881 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1994).
222. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.11 (Vernon 1989).

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
S.W.2d
228.

Thacker, 881 S.W.2d at 310.
880 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(a)(F)(b)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 11.15(b)(Vemon 1986).
A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d at 245 (citing D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Services, 851
351, 353 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ)).
869 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
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sion been reported to the DHS for leaving her children alone in "a
squalid house. '22 9 She was moved into public housing and advised not to
leave the children alone. When a caseworker visited a year later and
found the children alone again at 7:30 p.m., the children were placed in
foster care and Ybarra's rights terminated eighteen months later.
The question was whether the state had introduced sufficient evidence
of conditions endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the
children. 230 The court began by describing the parent-child relationship
as "perhaps the strongest bond between people in nature and the keystone of society," 231 a right of constitutional dimensions 232 requiring that
"any effort by the State to terminate it be strictly scrutinized. '2 33 Nonetheless, a considerable amount of evidence supported the DHS determination. The first time authorities intervened, the roof of the family's
house was open to the sky. On the second visit, there were not enough
beds for all the children, there was little food in the house, the children
were hungry and dirty, only one child was wearing shoes, and the younger
children were dressed only in underwear. Further testimony revealed
that Mrs. Ybarra had failed to apply for day care services or to attend
parenting classes, that she could not provide proof of attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and that she smelled of alcohol when she
was found at work.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, however, emphasized contrary
evidence to the effect that Ybarra had not been able to get attendance
slips from her A.A. meetings, as well as her testimony that she had not
been drinking for several years, and concluded that the evidence did not
sustain a "clear and convincing" finding of endangerment. 234 In further
discussion, the court emphasized that matters Were not entirely within the
mother's control, since "poverty played a role" in the children's
235
condition.
The writer does not quarrel with the result in either A.D. E. or Ybarra.
What is clear and convincing evidence is, in any case, to some extent
found in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, Mrs. Ybarra had the advantage that one of the three DPS witnesses thought that termination would
not be in the best interest of the children. Nonetheless, the court's use of
poverty to excuse Mrs. Ybarra's neglect, while studiously ignoring the
same factor in the A.D.E. father's background, at least drives home the
fact that in appeals from termination of parental rights, the difference
between "no evidence" and "factually insufficient evidence" review may

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 577.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 15.02(a)(1)(D)(Vemon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
Ybarra, 869 S.W.2d at 576.
Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982)).
Id (citing Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)).
Id at 578.
Id. at 579.
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take on even greater significance than it does in an ordinary civil
236
appeal.
One case issued during the Survey period illustrates the successful termination of parental rights in favor of caregivers with whom the children
had been voluntarily placed for a long period of time. In Fite v. Nel237
Son,
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a
father's parental rights under relatively clear facts. The mother left the
child with the grandparents two days after birth; six months later, the
father deposited the couple's other two children. The father, who initially
denied paternity for the youngest child, visited the child twice a year and
contributed less than $10 per month of a $100 per month child support
obligation over a seventy-seven month period. Termination was sought
on the ground of failure to support.
The father did not try to prove financial inability to make support payments. Instead, he argued that the $100 per month support obligation
was for all three children, and that when he voluntarily reclaimed the two
older children, his support obligation ceased. 238 The court conceded that
this fact would be a defense to a contempt motion for nonsupport, but
concluded that it had no effect in a proceeding to terminate parental
rights. Moreover, since the $100 per month was for the support of all
three children, and the child in question remained with the grandparents,
the court reasoned that the father's only option was to seek a modification in the support order. This he did not do.
As in any such case, however, termination also must be proved to be in
the best interest of the child. 239 The trial court relied on the father's infrequent visits and initial doubts regarding paternity, together with evidence that the child viewed the grandparents as his "mom" and "dad"
and feared being taken away from them, as sufficient basis for terminating parental rights. 24° The result has been criticized as "particularly iffy,"
in view of the fact that the youngest child now is legally cut off from his
older brothers and sisters, and that any fears could have been allayed by
241
denying the father's motion to modify custody.
IWo criminal case raising double jeopardy questions deserves brief
mention because of some unusual procedural aspects relevant to termina236. See generally Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence"
Points of Error,38 TEX. L. REV. 361 (1960); William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another
Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence", 69 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1991). R.S. v.

B.J.J., 883 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, n.w.h.) forms an interesting contrast with
A.D.E., in that the court elected to consider the parents' complaint as raising a factual
sufficiency challenge, despite the fact that the appellate brief seemed to raise only a legal
sufficiency challenge. Id. at 714-15.
237. 869 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, n.w.h.).
238. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(c)(Vernon 1986)(providing that if the managing
conservator has voluntarily turned over the child to the support obligor, "the obligor may
affirmatively plead and prove the fact that actual support was supplied to the child as a
defense in whole or in part to a motion for contempt").
239. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(a)(2)(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1995).
240. Fite, 869 S.W.2d at 607.
241. John J. Sampson, SAPCR-Termination, 1994-2 STATE BAR SEC. REP. FAM. L. 40.
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tion proceedings. In Manning v. State,2 4 2 Jeffrey Manning testified in a
preliminary termination hearing that serious injuries to his child resulted
from horseplay. The court disagreed and ordered the Department of
Human Services to serve as the child's temporary conservator. This termination proceeding was later consolidated with a suit for divorce. During the hearing on the consolidated cases, Mr. Manning admitted that his
earlier testimony was false. This decision to "come clean" no doubt was
influenced by the fact that, during the interim between the two hearings,
Manning had been convicted by another court of injury to a child and
placed on probation.
The state initially moved to have Manning's probation revoked on the
ground that he had committed perjury in the termination action. When
the court refused to revoke probation, the state sought and obtained a
conviction for perjury. Manning argued that he did not commit perjury
because he retracted his false statement and, alternatively, that the perjury conviction after the state's unsuccessful attempt to revoke probation
constituted double jeopardy. He lost on both grounds. The Eastland
Court of Appeals reasoned that the consolidated divorce/termination
case was not the same "official proceeding" 243 in which Manning made
the false statement, and that the retraction defense to perjury thus did not
apply. 244 Manning's double jeopardy challenge failed on the ground that
a failure to revoke probation is not a ruling on the underlying charge, and
that the decision not to revoke probation could have been grounded in
the belief that Manning's perjury occurred before his probation, rather
245
than that no perjury had taken place.
Malone v. State,246 an appeal from a ninety-nine year sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a child, also involved a double jeopardy question and the juxtaposition of civil and criminal proceedings. Robert
Malone argued that the failure of a civil jury to find that he had "engaged
in conduct.., which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of
the child," 247 and the jury's concomitant failure to terminate his parental
rights, should operate to bar a later conviction for sexual assault of a
child, since the sole evidence at the civil trial of his "conduct" was the
same alleged sexual assault of a child on which his criminal conviction
rested.
242. 870 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1994, writ ref'd).

243. Both the statutory definition of perjury and the retraction defense to perjury use
the language "official proceeding," not "case," to define the crime and defense. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 37.02, 37.05 (Vernon 1989).
244. Manning, 870 S.W.2d at 202. While the question was not discussed by the court, it
seems as if Manning would have had trouble with another requirement of the retraction
defense, that the retraction take place "before it became manifest that the falsity of the
statement would be exposed." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.05(2)(Vernon 1989). Manning's conviction for injury to a child undoubtedly cast considerable doubt on the veracity
of his earlier explanation for the child's injuries.
245. Manning, 870 S.W.2d at 203.
246. 864 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
247. Id. at 158.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Malone's appeal on both
grounds. Ordinarily, only successive criminal prosecutions constitute
double jeopardy. 248 While recognizing that on rare occasions an ostensibly civil remedy may be so punitive in purpose or effect that it equates
with a criminal prosecution, 249 the Malone court reasoned that a termination proceeding is "remedial in nature and relates to the State's interest
in protecting abused and neglected children, not punishment of the parent. ' 25 0 While the court felt Malone's collateral estoppel argument-that
the first judgment necessarily included a finding that he did not sexually
abuse his child-was better grounded, there was no trial court record to
permit the court to51determine whether the issue of sexual abuse was spe2
cifically litigated.
The writer's impression is that Manning and Malone represent the
mainstream view that criminal proceedings after civil actions should not
be barred. It is worth noting, however, that a federal circuit conflict on
an analogous question seems to be heating up. Several circuits, including
the Fifth,252 have held that successful civil forfeiture actions (usually in
the drug context) do not raise a bar to subsequent criminal proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit, however, recently has ruled that such civil forfeiture
actions must be brought in the same proceeding as the criminal charges,
25 3
or have the later action struck on double jeopardy grounds.

248. Id. at 158 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
249. Id. at 159 (citing Ex parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
no pet.).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 160.
252. See, e.g., United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom.,
Anderson v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 573 (1994).

253. See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1994).

